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FEDERALISM
Can States Prohibit Municipalities
From Offering Commercial Telephone
Services to the Public?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW 4r United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 190-194. © 2003 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Does 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
preempt Missouri statute 392.4107,
which prohibits municipalities from
providing commercial telephone
service?
FACTS
Section 392.4107 of the Missouri
statutes addresses the authority of
municipalities with regard to
telecommunications services. It per-
mits a municipality to allow nondis-
criminatory use of its rights of way
and to provide certain kinds of
telecommunications services, such
as those for its own use, for emer-
gency services, medical or educa-
tional purposes, or Internet-type
services. However, it denies munici-
palities the authority to provide or
offer for sale commercial telephone
service.
The lissouri Municipal League, the
Missouri Association of Municipal
Utilities, City Utilities of Springfield,
City of Columbia Water and Light,
and the City of Sikeston Board of
Utilities (the respondents) filed a
joint petition on July 8, 1998, with
the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), claiming that
Section 392.4107 is preempted by
Section 253(a) of the Telecommun-
ications Act of 1996. Section 253(a)
bars state or local laws from pro-
hibiting any entity from providing
any interstate or intrastate telecom-
munications service.
This was the second time that the
FCC had been asked to invoke
Section 253(a) to preempt state
laws that prevented municipalities
from engaging in the telecommuni-
cations business. Soon after the
respondents' filing, the FCC issued
an order denying a request by the
City of Abilene, Texas, to preempt
Texas statutes that were similar to
Missouri's statute. While the respon-
dents' petition was pending before
the FCC, the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the FCC's decision
not to preempt the Texas statutes.
City of Abilene, Texas v. Federal
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Communications Comm'n., 164
F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The State of Missouri filed com-
ments with the FCC and asserted its
right to control the activities of its
own municipalities. The state urged
the FCC to deny the respondents'
petition. On January 12, 2001, the
FCC issued its order and followed
the City of Abilene decision. The
FCC declined to hold that the
Missouri statute was preempted by
Section 253(a). In re Missouri
Municipal League, 16 F.C.C. Red.
1157 (2001). The respondents
appealed the FCC's decision to the
Eighth Circuit. The State of
Missouri again intervened. The
Eighth Circuit reversed the FCC's
decision. Missouri Municipal
League v. EC.C., 299 F.3d 949 (8th
Cir. 2002).
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the
term "any entity" in the federal
statute is both broad and clear and
that municipalities are "entities"
within the Act. Therefore, the states
cannot in any way prevent munici-
palities from engaging in the com-
mercial telecommunications busi-
ness. Missouri, the FCC, and
Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P.
(the petitioners) each filed petitions
for writs of certiorari. The Court
granted the writs and consolidated
the petitions on June 23, 2003. 123
S.Ct. 2605 (2003); 123 S.Ct. 2606
(2003); 123 S.Ct. 2607 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Telecommunications Act of
1996 created a new telecommunica-
tions regime designed to foster com-
petition in local telephone markets.
The purpose of the Act was to pro-
mote competition and reduce regu-
lation in order to secure lower
prices and higher-quality services
for American telecommunications
customers. The Act fundamentally
restructured local telephone mar-
kets by providing that states may no
longer enforce laws that impede
competition. Section 253(a) of the
Act provides that no state or local
statute or regulation, or other state
or local legal requirement, may pro-
hibit or have the effect of prohibit-
ing the ability of any entity to pro-
vide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service.
Petitioners assert that the Act does
not apply when a state is regulating
its own subdivision. They argue that
the ability of a state to define the
authority of its subdivisions is a fun-
damental part of a state's sovereign-
ty. If Section 253(a) of the Act
included state subdivisions among
the "entities" that neither states nor
local governments can prohibit from
entering the commercial telecom-
munications business, it would
usurp the states' authority to define
their own administrative and politi-
cal structures. Such usurpation is
clearly outside the scope of congres-
sional authority. Separation of pow-
ers is a key element of our constitu-
tional scheme. The division of pow-
er among sovereigns (between the
federal government and the states)
is critical to the protection of liber-
ty. Dual sovereignty contemplates
substance, not just form. The sover-
eign states have powers indepen-
dent of the federal government and
cannot be overruled by those of the
federal government.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has never catalogued the fundamen-
tal decisions that lie beyond con-
gressional control. The Founders,
however, did observe in the
Federalist Papers that the states'
retained powers "extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the peo-
ple, and the internal order, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the State."
Petitioners maintain that the class
of power "inherent" in state sover-
eignty includes the power to create
and define the authority of its politi-
cal subdivisions. The subdivisions of
the states, including cities, counties,
municipalities, and other such orga-
nizations, have no independent
right to act or even to exist apart
from the state. Further, the state's
grant of power to a subdivision is
not permanent. The state may, at its
pleasure, modify or withdraw all
such powers or vest them in other
agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipality,
or repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. To permit Congress
to usurp the states' authority to
withhold, grant, or withdraw powers
and privileges through a federal
statute would threaten one of the
Constitution's structural protec-
tions. Absent an explicit grant of
authority to Congress that permits
the federal government to interfere,
states retain the ability to define the
authority of their political subdivi-
sions. This principle is central to
our constitutional scheme.
Petitioners further argue that the
Commerce Clause does not give
Congress the power to usurp a
states' power over its municipalities.
Clearly, the Commerce Clause is
broadly worded, but it does have its
limits. One of those limits is the
point at which the power of
Congress under the Commerce
Clause meets the power of the
states to determine their own orga-
nization and structure. The
Commerce Clause cannot be used
to interfere with a state's control
over itself. Another limit is the his-
torical intent of the Commerce
Clause. Though the Commerce
Clause was originally intended to
break down the barriers to the free
flow of trade, the Supreme Court
has construed it to cover a broader
(Continued on Pane 192)
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range of activities. The Court has
identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate
under its commerce power. It is
authorized to regulate the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; to
regulate persons or things in inter-
state commerce; and to regulate
those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.
Petitioners argue that the only
authority to support Congress's
actions in this case is that the activ-
ity to be regulated has a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. In
determining what activity has a sub-
stantial relation to interstate com-
merce, the Supreme Court has per-
mitted Congress to aggregate effects
of seemingly local acts. But extend-
ing the aggregation principle too far
threatens to erase the distinction
between national and local authori-
ty. That threat is particularly real
when the activities being aggregated
are those at the core of state
responsibility. When Congress
attempts to directly regulate the
states as states, the Tenth
Amendment requires recognition
that "there are attributes of sover-
eignty attaching to every state gov-
ernment which may not be
impaired by Congress." National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). This principle exists not
because Congress may lack an affir-
mative grant of legislative authority
to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exer-
cising the authority in that manner.
The Tenth Amendment protects the
states from Congress's attempted
usurpation in this case.
The federalism issues can be avoid-
ed by adopting a narrow construc-
tion of the Act, the petitioners
argue. A narrow interpretation that
does not include municipalities
within the "any entity" phrase
avoids usurping the states' powers.
Generally, Congress only preempts
the states' historic sovereign powers
when it uses language that is clear
and manifest. In the past 20 years,
the Supreme Court has consistently
insisted on congressional compli-
ance with the "clear and manifest"
standard. A general reference to
.any entity" does not clearly and
manifestly preempt state authority.
The Telecommunications Act does
not contain a pertinent definition or
provision that references the ability
of the states or their subdivisions to
engage in the commercial telecom-
munications business. The sole basis
for the Eighth Circuit's holding is
that "any entity" is in all-inclusive
term. A similarly broad term, "per-
son," is also used at various places
in the Code. However, when the
Supreme Court applied the "clear
and manifest" standard to "person,"
it found that term wanting. The
Supreme Court held that "every per-
son," as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
did not include a state, even though
a state fits within some definitions of
"person." That "any entity," so
broadly defined, does not clearly and
manifestly include the states and
their subdivisions is additionally evi-
dent from the fact that beyond the
Eighth Circuit, another court of
appeals, two state supreme courts, a
third state appellate court, a federal
district court, and the FCC disagree
about whether the term "any entity"
extends to municipalities. This split
among the courts, regardless of
which one has correctly discerned
congressional intent, demonstrates
that the congressional language is
neither clear nor manifest.
Finally, the petitioners note that the
language of the statute itself accom-
modates only one logical reading.
Section 253(a) says that no state or
local statute or regulation, or other
state or local legal requirement,
may prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the ability of any entity
to provide interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service. The
statute describes its involvement in
telecommunications regulation from
two different directions. The first is
the source of the regulation, the
state and local government. The
second direction is the source of
competition-"any entity" that
wishes to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications ser-
vice. The Eighth Circuit's reading of
the statute makes the source of reg-
ulation part of the source of compe-
tition. That reading makes no sense.
Though a state may be unable to
interfere with the decisions of pri-
vate companies to enter the
telecommunications business, obvi-
ously the state must be able to
make the same choice about
whether to enter that business
itself. The statute cannot logically
be read to take such basic authority
away from a state.
Respondents argue that the plain
meaning of Section 253(a) preempts
Missouri's ban on municipal entry
into the telecommunications mar-
kets. There is no dispute in this
case that Missouri has enacted a
statute that prohibits municipalities
from providing telecommunications
service. If, however, municipalities
are entities within the meaning of
Section 253(a), then the Missouri
statute must be preempted.
Municipalities are, in the ordinary
English usage of the term, unques-
tionably "entities." Indeed, this
point is so clear that the petitioners
appear not to dispute it. The Black's
Law Dictionary definition, quoted
by the Eighth Circuit, explicitly
defines "entity" to include subdivi-
sions of state governments. The
Oxford English Dictionary defines
"entity" as a thing that has a real
existence, as opposed to a relational
function. It would be very odd to
Issue No. 4
say that municipalities do not have
a real existence.
Petitioners insist that municipalities
are not entities because they are
part of the state and dependent
upon it for any powers they may be
authorized to wield. It is true, of
course, that municipalities are cre-
ated and empowered by the state.
But once a municipality is created it
is, in ordinary usage, an entity with
a real existence. Indeed, if munici-
palities were not entities because
they owe their existence and their
powers to the state, then private
corporations, which also owe their
existence and powers to the state,
would not be entities under Section
253(a). Municipalities are clearly
separate entities from the state.
They can sue and be sued. They can
enter into contracts and own prop-
erty. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that municipalities
do not partake of the states' sover-
eign immunity under the
Constitution. Also, Congress has
made municipalities, but not states,
subject to suit under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. It is abundantly clear that a
municipality has an existence sepa-
rate from the state that created it.
Respondents further note that the
most conspicuous feature of the lan-
guage of Section 253(a) is its inclu-
siveness. The language evinces a
desire to foreclose any possible
claim that some potential entrants
into the telecommunications market
are unprotected. The choice of the
term "entity" is itself evidence of its
breadth. It is hard to think of any
term that could be more inclusive.
Congress did not choose a narrower
and more ambiguous term, such as
"person." It did not try to list the
various kinds of potential entrants
into telecommunications markets
that might be covered by the sec-
tion. The distinguishing characteris-
tic of the term "entity" is precisely
its inclusiveness. It is the word one
would use if one wanted to omit no
possibilities.
The respondents reason that if there
is any doubt that Section 253(a),
interpreted according to its plain
meaning, is fully inclusive, that
doubt is removed by Congress's use
of the term "any." The Supreme
Court has repeatedly ruled that the
modifier "any" precludes a narrow
construction of the modified term.
Congress prohibited barriers that
prevent "any entity" from compet-
ing. As a matter of ordinary mean-
ing, the modifier "any" means that
the modified phrase is to be inter-
preted as expansively as possible.
The term "entity" is a notably inclu-
sive term. Thus, the phrase "any
entity," if given its plain meaning,
unquestionably includes municipali-
ties. The meaning of Section 253(a)
could hardly be clearer.
Respondents further postulate that
there are powerful reasons to inter-
pret Section 253(a) to include
municipalities that seek to provide
telecommunications services.
Municipalities are a singularly
important source of competition in
the telecommunication market.
Congress knew that when it enacted
the Telecommunications Act.
Municipalities are typically well
positioned to compete in rural
areas. For example, respondents
noted an FCC case study in Iowa
where consumers had exceptional
access to advanced telecommunica-
tions services that was encouraged
by municipal involvement in the
deployment of telecommunications
services.
The FCC has also noted that munic-
ipalities also serve large cities, such
as Los Angeles, Seattle, Cleveland,
and San Antonio, and could be
potential competitors in those areas
as well. Also, the legislative history
of the Act could not be more explic-
it in stating that municipal utilities
are among the "entities" whose
right to enter telecommunications
markets is protected by Section
253(a). The Joint Explanatory
Statement by the conference com-
mittee on the bills that became the
Telecommunications Act stated that
explicit prohibitions on entry by a
utility into telecommunications are
preempted under this section. The
Senate Report that accompanied the
provision that became Section
253(a) explained, in its summary of
the major features of the bill, that
this provision "allows all electric,
gas, water, steam, and other utilities
to provide telecommunications."
Elsewhere, the Senate Report also
discussed at great length the impor-
tance of electric utilities as potential
competitors in telecommunications
markets. Congress unquestionably
intended municipal utilities to be
among the entities protected by
Section 253(a).
Respondents argue that interpreting
the section according to its plain
meaning is not an extraordinary
incursion into state sovereignty.
Congress will often grant or deny
local governments certain limited
powers, notwithstanding state law to
the contrary. The Supreme Court
has ruled that Congress may grant
local governments certain preroga-
tives that state law cannot override.
Also, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted acts of Congress in a way
that has resulted in their interfering
in a state's internal allocation of
authority among itself and its politi-
cal subdivisions. The Court has giv-
en no indication that this consti-
tutes a troubling affront to state sov-
ereignty. Clearly, there is no serious
intrusion into state sovereignty by
Section 253(a).
Respondents also assert that inter-
preting Section 253(a) to preempt
the Missouri statute raises no sub-
(Continued on Pane 194)
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stantial constitutional questions.
Petitioners argue that the section
would be unconstitutional if it were
interpreted in accordance with its
plain meaning. The respondents say
this argument has no foundation.
They admit that some extreme fed-
eral intrusions into a state's decision
about how to organize its internal
affairs would violate the
Constitution. Section 253(a), how-
ever, imposes only the most limited,
and reasonable, restrictions on state
authority. Section 253(a) does not
commandeer any state because it
does not compel any state to do
anything. Rather, it requires the
states only to refrain from enacting
anti-competitive barriers to entry.
Finally, the petitioners assert that
under the principle of Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the
Supreme Court may not interpret
Section 253(a) according to its plain
meaning. Rather, the Court should
insist on a more explicit statement
of Congress's intention to prohibit
state laws that prevent municipali-
ties from entering telecommunica-
tion markets. In the respondent's
view, this contention is wrong for a
number of reasons. First, the pre-
sumption of Gregory v. Ashcroft
applies only when a statute is
ambiguous. This statute is not
ambiguous, but has a plain meaning.
Second, even when the Gregory
presumption does apply, it does not
automatically require that every
ambiguity be resolved by limiting
the scope of an act of Congress.
The Supreme Court has made clear
that the effect of federal legislation
on the internal allocation of power
within a state is a factor to be con-
sidered in determining the proper
interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, but is not necessarily deci-
sive. Essentially, the petitioners'
claim is that the prohibition con-
tained in Section 253(a) cannot
apply to municipalities unless
Congress explicitly refers to munici-
palities in the text of the statute.
The Supreme Court has never
imposed that kind of rigid rule on
Congress even in cases dealing with
state sovereign immunity in which
federalism concerns are arguably at
the highest level.
SIGNIFICANCE
The dividing line between federal
and state sovereignty is barely dis-
cernible. Each case argued before
the Supreme Court provides an
opportunity to incrementally bright-
en the line. Obviously, important
federal interests must outweigh the
states' interest in controlling the
subject matter at hand. In this case,
the subject matter is the telecom-
munications industry, and specifi-
cally intrastate and interstate tele-
phone services. Congress' Act states
that no state law shall have the
effect of prohibiting "any entity"
from providing interstate or
intrastate telecommunications ser-
vice. The state of Missouri has pro-
hibited its municipalities from offer-
ing local telephone service. Will
Congress's interest in fostering com-
petition in the telecommunication
industry outweigh the states' inter-
est in controlling its own political
subdivision? The Supreme Court
will decide.
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